How It Works

No cameras. No microphones.
Presence, proven.

This is the complete explanation. How a penny-sized node senses movement and wakes the hub, how the hub reads the surrounding radio environment without connecting to anything, how device clusters handle MAC randomization, how every record is hash-signed into a tamper-evident chain, and how that record travels from a jewelry box to a courtroom. If a question isn't answered on this page, ask us and we'll add it.

Passive
Listens to broadcasts · never connects to any device
SHA-256
Every record hash-signed and chained at capture
Cellular
Uploads independent of your Wi-Fi and power
0
Cameras, microphones, or GPS trackers inside
The One-Paragraph Version

Every device announces itself.
We just write it down.

Every modern phone, smartwatch, earbud, fitness tracker, and keyfob constantly emits short radio announcements as part of normal operation: Wi-Fi probe requests looking for known networks, and Bluetooth Low Energy advertisements looking for paired accessories. These broadcasts happen many times per minute, whether or not the device is being used, and they carry public identifiers. The Digital Tripwire hub (Home on your shelf, Mobile in your bag) is a passive listener. It never connects to any device, never intercepts any communication, and never captures any content. It records which identifiers were audible, how strong each signal was, and exactly when.

The penny-sized nodes are the tripwires. A node does one job: it senses when the object it lives inside moves, and sends a tiny encrypted Bluetooth trigger to the hub. The hub does everything else: wakes, scans the radio environment, correlates the devices present, writes the record, hash-signs it, and uploads it. That division of labor is the whole design. It's why nodes can be tiny, cheap enough to put everywhere, and run for years on a coin cell, while the serious electronics live in one hub that's always powered and always reachable. The hub protects the zone around it on its own; nodes extend that protection into specific objects: a jewelry box, a firearm case, a backpack, a glovebox.

Digital Tripwire node color-matched on a jewelry box
The Pipeline · Interactive

The life of an event,
in five stages.

Watch one event travel the full pipeline: a protected object moves, its node wakes the hub, the hub reads the room, the cluster forms, and the record is written, hash-signed into the chain, and uploaded off-site. Everything below the animation explains each stage in detail.

Detection pipeline · from radio broadcast to sealed record IDLE
TRIGGER node senses motion DETECT hub scans the air CLUSTER devices correlate LOG record written SIGN sha-256 chained UPLOAD off-site · encrypted Press play to follow one detection through the pipeline
✓ Sealed. The record now exists off-site, hash-chained, and beyond quiet edit — about two seconds after the object moved.
Destroying the node, cutting the power, or killing the Wi-Fi after this point changes nothing. The evidence already left the building.
Stage by Stage

Each stage, in detail.

1

Trigger · the node senses movement

A node is a penny-sized motion sensor with one job. It lives inside the object it protects, and the instant that object moves, it sends a tiny encrypted Bluetooth trigger to the hub. That's the entire node: motion sensing, a BLE transmitter, and a coin cell that lasts for years precisely because the node does nothing else. No scanning, no cellular, no waiting around burning power. The hub also guards its own zone continuously without any nodes; nodes extend the tripwire into specific objects.

2

Detect · the hub scans the air

The trigger wakes the hub, and the hub's scanning radio reads the surrounding Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Low Energy environment: the announcements every modern device makes many times per minute. Passive means passive: the hub transmits nothing at anyone, connects to nothing, and captures no communication content. Signal strength (RSSI) places each device in a proximity band: touching-distance, arm's reach, same room, or edge of range. Proximity is banded, not measured in centimeters, and we say so, because honest resolution claims are what survive cross-examination.

3

Cluster · devices that travel together

A single identifier can be random. Five identifiers that appear together, move together, and disappear together are a pattern. The hub correlates signals that arrive with matching timing across visits into a device cluster: phone + watch + earbuds + tracker + fob. Clusters are the unit the system reasons about, which is exactly how it stays reliable in a world of MAC randomization (full detail two sections down).

4

Log · the record is written

Each event becomes a structured record on the hub: which node triggered it, the zone label, UTC timestamp, the device signatures observed (stored as salted hashes, not raw identifiers), the proximity band, dwell duration, and the cluster confidence score. The full field list is documented in the record section below, because a record you can't inspect is a record you shouldn't trust.

5

Sign · sealed into the chain

The hub hashes the record with SHA-256 at capture, embedding the hash of the previous record inside it before hashing. That makes the log an append-only chain: silently altering any historical entry changes its hash, which breaks every entry after it, visibly and provably. Tamper-evident is not a marketing word here; it's the data structure.

6

Upload · off-site from the hub

The hub uploads the sealed record, encrypted in transit, to off-site storage. Home sits on USB-C power and stays reachable around the clock; Mobile rides with you and does the same job wherever it is. By the time anyone could interfere with a node, or the hub, the record is already off-site. Storage is encrypted at rest, and the chain verifies end-to-end on every export.

Inside the Hardware

Two devices.
One division of labor.

The node is deliberately almost nothing: a motion sensor with a radio whisper. The hub is deliberately everything else. The absences in both are the privacy architecture.

The Node penny-sized · lives inside the object
COLOR-SWATCH STICKER · visible placements only MOTION accelerometer BLE TRIGGER encrypted whisper COIN CELL years of battery · one job residue-free adhesive · lifts clean NOT IN THE NODE NO CAMERA · NO MICROPHONE · NO GPS TRACKER NO SCANNER · NO CELLULAR · NO STORED RECORDS
The Hub Home on USB-C · Mobile in your bag
LCD · live status · nearby devices NODE RECEIVER hears every trigger SCANNING RADIO Wi-Fi + BLE passive SIGNING ELEMENT sha-256 · chain CLUSTER ENGINE constellation match CELLULAR UPLINK encrypted upload POWER USB-C · battery NOT IN THE HUB NO CAMERA · NO MICROPHONE · NO GPS TRACKER
The Hard Question

"Doesn't MAC randomization
break this?"

Partly, and the honest answer is more interesting than a yes or a no. Randomization makes a lone identifier a poor long-term handle: you can't build a months-long profile of a stranger off one rotating address, which is exactly what it was designed to prevent. But random doesn't mean gone in seconds. Rotation runs on very different clocks: phone Bluetooth addresses rotate on roughly quarter-hour timers, randomized per-network Wi-Fi MACs persist for as long as the phone keeps using that network, and many accessories (watches, earbuds, trackers, fobs) rotate rarely or never. An identifier captured at 2pm is often still the same identifier at 6pm, and sometimes still the same identifier next month. What randomization really does is put a decaying shelf life on single identifiers, and the decay rate depends on the device.

That's why the system doesn't bet on any single identifier. It matches on the device cluster: everything a person consistently carries. A phone randomizes toward unknown networks, but the smartwatch paired to it, the earbuds in the pocket, the fitness tracker on the wrist, and the keyfob on the ring largely broadcast consistent identifiers, and even the phone itself emits stable signatures in its BLE traffic with paired accessories. Five signals with correlated timing across multiple visits is a fingerprint that one rotating MAC can't erase. Each additional consistent device raises the cluster confidence score; a lone unmatched identifier stays a low-confidence observation and is treated exactly that way.

What we promise, precisely: high-confidence matching against device clusters, honest confidence scoring on every event, and low-confidence events labeled as such rather than dressed up. What we do not promise: magic identification of a person carrying zero devices, or defeat of a sophisticated adversary who leaves everything at home. No proximity system can promise that, and the ones that imply it should worry you.

And randomization has a second act that most people, including most investigators, don't know about. The next section covers it.

Multiple personal devices forming a cluster
The Second Act · Post-Incident Attribution

A "random" identifier
is not random forever.

Randomization protects against casual tracking. It does not protect against lawful investigation, and the gap between those two is where a Digital Tripwire log becomes an investigator's exhibit. Three mechanisms turn a logged identifier into a lead or a match, on three different clocks.

Mechanism 1 · Hours to Days

The hot window

Rotation runs on a clock, and the clock leaves a window. An identifier logged during an incident is often still live hours or days later: slow-rotating phone addresses, and accessories that barely rotate at all. Inside that window, the same identifier showing up in a canvass or a follow-up sweep is a lead an investigator can act on now, before any seizure. The shelf life varies by device type, which is exactly why the log records what kind of identifier each event captured.

Mechanism 2 · After Seizure

Stored per-network Wi-Fi MACs

A phone doesn't invent a new random MAC every minute. For networks it joins, it generates one private address per network, stores it, and reuses it for that network going forward. Those stored per-network MACs sit in the phone's configuration data and are recovered in a standard forensic extraction of a lawfully seized device. If the log holds that MAC, the extraction produces the direct match.

Mechanism 3 · After Seizure

The Identity Resolving Key

Rotating Bluetooth addresses look random, but they're generated from a key stored on the device: the IRK. Anyone holding the IRK can mathematically resolve every past rotating address that device ever broadcast. Extract the IRK from the seized phone, and the "anonymous" BLE addresses a node logged weeks earlier resolve to that specific device, provably.

AT CAPTURE
identifierrotating BLE addr
attributionunknown
confidencelow · logged anyway
sealed: sha256 3e14…a802
DEVICE SEIZED
authoritywarrant
extractionstandard forensic
recoveredIRK + stored MACs
weeks after capture
RESOLVED
logged addr✓ resolves to device
record agepredates seizure
chain✓ intact
corroborating exhibit

This is why Digital Tripwire retains every event, including low-confidence single-identifier detections that mean nothing on the day they're captured. The system doesn't discard what it can't yet explain. And it's why the hash chain isn't a decoration: because each record was sealed at capture, months before anyone knew which device would be seized, no one can argue the identifier was written into the log after the fact. The record predates the suspicion, and the mathematics proves it.

For Investigators

Designed for
detectives.

Most theft investigations start with nothing: no witnesses, stale footage, a loss noticed weeks late, and a suspect pool the size of everyone who ever had access. A Digital Tripwire log changes the starting position. Here's what it hands an investigator on day one.

1

A timeline before the first interview

Who was near the item, when, and for how long, documented before anyone is questioned. Interviews stop being fishing expeditions and start testing statements against sealed timestamps. "Were you near the safe on the 11th?" is a very different question when the answer is already written down.

2

Alibi testing that ends arguments

"I was never in that room" meets a hash-sealed record of a device cluster at arm's reach for four minutes. The timestamps were sealed months before the claim was made, which forecloses the usual argument that the evidence was assembled to fit the theory.

3

A suspect pool that shrinks fast

Exclusion is evidence too. The log clears the people who were never near the item as fast as it flags the ones who were, which protects the innocent, preserves workplace relationships that blanket suspicion destroys, and saves the weeks normally burned eliminating people one interview at a time.

4

Particularized facts for the affidavit

Warrant applications need specific, articulable facts. "A device cluster was logged at the jewelry box for 247 seconds at 18:47 UTC on the 11th, sealed at capture" is exactly that: concrete, timestamped, and independently verifiable, which is what moves an affidavit from hunch to probable cause.

5

The extraction payoff

Once a device is lawfully seized, the standard forensic pull recovers stored per-network MACs and the IRK, and the "anonymous" identifiers in the log resolve to the specific device (the full mechanism is in the section above). The log you collected at deployment becomes matchable evidence through the extraction workflow your lab already runs.

6

Chain of custody without the headache

Camera evidence arrives with a custody problem attached: who pulled the DVR, who copied the file, whether the timestamp drifted. This record arrives pre-sealed: hashed at capture, chained, uploaded off-site, exported in a documented format any expert can verify, including the defense's. The custody argument is over before it starts.

One honest limit, because investigators respect honest limits: the log doesn't solve cases. It de-noises them. Presence isn't guilt, absence isn't innocence, and the confidence score is printed on every event for a reason. The detective still detects. The log just means they start from documented ground instead of from zero. And it cuts both ways by design: the same export that supports a prosecution is discoverable, verifiable, and equally available to the defense.

The Record

One event,
every field explained.

This is a representative log entry, field by field. We publish the structure because an evidence format that can't be inspected can't be trusted, by you or by a court.

event_idevt_9f2a71c4unique event reference
node_iddtw-4A31-0E88which node triggered it
zonejewelry-box-primaryyour label for the placement
ts_utc2026-07-11T18:47:22.418Zcapture time, UTC, millisecond
signatures5 × salted-hashdevice IDs, hashed — raw identifiers never stored
proximityband-1 · arm's reachRSSI band, not false precision
dwell_s247seconds the cluster stayed in band
confidence0.93cluster match score, always shown
prev_hashb872…5d19links to the prior record
sha2563e14…a802this record's seal
Chain of Custody

Why the record
can't be quietly edited.

Each record contains the hash of the one before it. Change any historical entry and its hash changes, which invalidates the next entry's stored prev_hash, which breaks every link after it. Tampering isn't prevented by policy. It's exposed by arithmetic.

EVENT 041
zonefront-door
time18:44:10Z
sha256: 77c1…09be
EVENT 042
zonejewelry-box
time18:47:22Z
prev: 77c1…09be
sha256: 3e14…a802
EVENT 043
zonejewelry-box
time18:51:39Z
prev: 3e14…a802
sha256: c9a4…71ef
EXPORT
chain✓ verified
formatdocumented
verifiable by any party
Hashed at capture, on the hub, before upload
Encrypted in transit over cellular, encrypted at rest
Export includes the full chain for independent verification
Moving or removing a node is itself a logged, uploaded, alerting event
What It Is Not

The privacy architecture
is the absences.

Surveillance products earn distrust by capturing more than they admit. Digital Tripwire is engineered the opposite way: the capabilities that make surveillance dangerous are not disabled by settings, they are absent from the hardware.

×

Not a camera

There is no image sensor anywhere in the hardware, node or hub. The system cannot see anyone, in your home or anyone else's. Nothing to hack, nothing to leak, nothing to subpoena that shows a face.

×

Not a microphone

There is no audio hardware. Nothing in the system can hear conversations, record ambient sound, or be repurposed as a listening device by anyone, including us.

×

Not a location tracker

There is no GPS. A node knows one place: where you put it. It cannot follow your family, your guests, or anyone else through the world. It logs presence at a point, not movement through space.

×

Not an identity database

Device identifiers are stored as salted hashes, not raw values. The system logs that a known cluster was present, not who a stranger is. Identity attribution happens through lawful context, never through a lookup we run.

×

Not a content interceptor

Passive listening captures broadcast announcements only. No messages, no calls, no browsing, no communication content of any kind is visible to the system, by physics, not by policy.

×

Not a data business

Your records are yours. They are not sold, not shared with advertisers, and not mined. The business model is hardware and service, and it stays that way because the evidence product dies the day that changes.

Expert Validation

What actually holds up
in court?

We asked former FBI forensics investigators, federal prosecutors, and family court judges. They'd never seen BLE proximity data used as evidence. Until now.

Nizar Balil

Nizar Balil

Former FBI & Interpol Digital Forensics Investigator. 20+ years in digital evidence analysis and courtroom testimony.
VERIFIED EXPERT
Lisa Pyle

Lisa Pyle

Former NYC Criminal Prosecutor & Federal Ethics Attorney
VERIFIED EXPERT
Marquis Jones

Marquis Jones

Former Family Court Judge & Deputy Attorney General
VERIFIED EXPERT
Every Question We Get

Asked and answered.

Modern phones, watches, earbuds, and trackers constantly emit short radio announcements (Wi-Fi probe requests and Bluetooth Low Energy advertisements) as part of normal operation, whether or not they're being used. The hub passively listens to these broadcasts; the penny-sized nodes don't scan at all, they just sense motion and wake the hub. Nothing is connected to, nothing is intercepted, and no communication content is ever visible to the system. Only the public identifiers, signal strength, and timing are logged.

It weakens single-identifier tracking rather than eliminating it: a rotating address is a poor long-term handle, but rotation runs on very different clocks, and a freshly logged identifier often stays live for hours or days. Digital Tripwire treats that honestly on three horizons. In real time, confidence comes from the device cluster: phone, smartwatch, earbuds, tracker, fob, most of which emit consistent identifiers, matched with temporal correlation and scored on every event. In the near term, a logged identifier inside its rotation window can be reacquired in the field as an investigative lead. And in the long term, identifiers become matchable after a lawful seizure through stored per-network MACs and IRK resolution, covered in the attribution section and the next question down.

Three properties working together. Authentication: each record is created automatically by a documented process at capture, on the node. Integrity: SHA-256 hashing with each record embedding the previous record's hash makes the log a tamper-evident chain, where any alteration is arithmetically visible. Custody: records upload immediately over cellular to encrypted storage, and export in a documented format with the full chain intact so any expert, including opposing counsel's, can verify it independently.

No, and not by settings: by hardware. There is no camera, no microphone, and no GPS in the node. It cannot see, hear, or follow anyone. It records device presence: which radio identifiers were near it, at what signal band, and when. The privacy section above walks through everything deliberately absent from the hardware.

Nodes run for years on a coin cell because they do exactly one job: sense motion, send a trigger. The hub monitors its paired nodes and the app shows each node's status and battery, with a health notification well before one needs attention. Home lives on USB-C power, so there's nothing to charge; Mobile recharges like a phone. Beyond that there is no routine maintenance: no cleaning, no recalibration, nothing to babysit.

Removal is itself evidence. Moving the node is exactly what a node detects, so the act of grabbing it fires the trigger: the hub wakes, scans the room, seals the record, and uploads it while the app alerts you in real time. And because records never live on the node in the first place (they're created on the hub and pushed off-site) destroying the node destroys nothing. In practice, the removal event plus the moments before it is often the most incriminating sequence in the whole log.

Yes. The hub uploads over an integrated cellular connection, independent of your Wi-Fi and your router, so cutting the internet (a classic pre-theft move against camera systems) changes nothing. Home runs on USB-C power with its internal battery carrying it through an outage; Mobile is battery-powered by nature. The nodes themselves run on their own coin cells and don't depend on building power at all.

Not by itself, and that's by design. The system logs device signatures, not identities, and the signatures are stored as salted hashes. Attribution to a person happens through context: an institution matching against a watch list it lawfully holds, or a post-incident comparison against the devices of the people known to have had access. The system's job is to document presence beyond dispute. Establishing identity remains with people and institutions using their existing lawful processes, which is exactly where a civil society should keep it.

Then it has no one to talk to, and we'd rather tell you that than pretend otherwise. Nodes speak short-range encrypted Bluetooth to hubs; a node that moves beyond every hub's range can't report until a hub is in range again. In practice that's a placement question: Home covers the rooms around it, and Mobile extends coverage to wherever you are, your car, your hotel room, your bag. Any hub on your account can hear any node on your account, so protection travels with your hardware, not with a single fixed box.

Often, yes, once a device is lawfully seized and forensically examined. Two mechanisms make this work. First, phones store the randomized Wi-Fi MAC they generate for each network and reuse it for that network, and those stored per-network MACs are recoverable in a standard forensic extraction. Second, rotating Bluetooth addresses are generated from the device's Identity Resolving Key (IRK); with the IRK extracted from the seized device, every past rotating address it broadcast becomes mathematically resolvable, including ones the hub logged weeks earlier. This is why the system retains every event, even low-confidence single-identifier detections: an identifier that meant nothing at capture can become the corroborating link after seizure, and the hash chain proves the record existed before anyone knew which device to look for.

Now You Know How

Simple physics.
Serious mathematics.

Passive detection, cluster matching, hash-chained records, cellular upload. Now put it somewhere that matters.